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            The EU Market Abuse Regulation, where does it leave us? 









Most of the Market Abuse Regulation (“the Regulation”) came into force from 3
rd
 July 2016, 
whilst in the rest of the EU the European Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse 
also came into effect. In the UK the latter has not been adopted as the area was already 
covered by a range of criminal laws such the existing insider dealing laws, sections 89 – 91 
Financial Services Act 2012, the Fraud Act 2006 and the offence of conspiracy to defraud
2
. 
The purpose of the new Regulation was to create a level playing field across the EU and thus 
avoid regulatory arbitrage whilst continuing with the aim of protecting the integrity of the 
financial markets and to enhance investor confidence based on the assurance that investors 
will be placed on an equal footing and be protected from the misuse of inside information by 





 makes a number of predications, not all of them necessarily consistent, 
stating that the purpose of the Regulation is to preserve market integrity, avoid potential 
regulatory arbitrage, ensure legal accountability, provide for more legal certainty and less 
regulatory complexity for market participants. It also provides for a widening of the law to 
cover trading facilities which previously operated outside the law and benchmarks. These are 
multilateral trading facilities (MTFs)
5
 and organised trading facilities (OTFs)
6
 which are 
discussed below. In addition, OTC
7




intended to be included where market abuse could impact on the contract. The time at which 
the law can have an impact is brought forward and now activates at the point at which an 
application to trade is made.
8
  
This article seeks to analyse the issues arising from the new Regulation and the uncertainty 
left by both parts of the wording and the unwillingness of ESMA
9
 and the FCA to provide 
clearer guidance. This will be done by examining the wording of the relevant parts of the 
Regulation and the limited guidance that has been provided on it. The impact on research, 
managers’ disclosure requirements, chinese walls and investment advice are all considered to 
the extent necessary to illuminate the position under the new Regulation. Those cases and 
enforcement actions that assist in interpretation are also considered and this article thus 
considers the content and effects of the Regulation and the impact which it has on those 
operating in the market place.  
The new law is based on the definition of “financial instrument” in the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive II (MiFID II)
10
 which is wider than its predecessor (see below),
11
  and 
there are also revisions to the stabilisation
12
 and buy back regulations
13
. Stabilisation must 
involve the price being kept between certain limits and must only be carried out for a limited 
period of time, with disclosure of relevant information. Buy backs must involve full details 
being disclosed prior to the start of trading, reports being made to the relevant authority and 
with subsequent disclosure to the public. In addition, certain types of high frequency trading 
and abusive algorithms are banned because of their potential for abusing markets.  
In terms of its content the Regulation replaces
14
 the pre-existing market abuse regime in the 
UK which consisted of s. 118 and s.123 (1) Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 




 and market 
manipulation
17




definition has a wider meaning than under the preceding law and also has a wider scope, but 
on the other hand the ‘misleading statements’ and ‘market distortion’ elements of the 
preceding law appear to have been repealed. This will be discussed later. The existing 
criminal laws relating to insider dealing
18
 are still in place in the UK but in addition the 
connected FCA rules have been replaced and changes made to the FCA rules at Chapters 2 
and 3 together with the Disclosure and Transparency Rules and the amended Code of Market 
Conduct (MAR).
19
 It should be added that issuers whose securities have been admitted to 
trading on an MTF, but no other market in the EU, without their consent are still subject to 
the EU market abuse, insider dealing and market manipulation laws but not to the disclosure, 
insider lists and the directors’ and senior officers’ transaction rules. Matters become more 
complex if such an issuer then engages in own account dealing in relation to the investments 
as the insider dealing laws will potentially import. 
The Regulation covers financial instruments that are traded or for which a request to trade has 
been made on an MTF, an OTF or a derivative where the price depends on one of the above. 
Essentially it extends the scope of the law in this area to new markets and platforms and 
extends the range of behaviour caught by the law. In particular it has resulted in significant 
new disclosure and compliance requirements. The Regulation also expands the reach of some 
of the EU rules to markets that previously operated outside the EU’s market abuse regime, 
such as the Irish Stock Exchange’s exchange-regulated section, those of the Luxembourg 
Stock Exchange Euro MTF Market and London’s AIM.
20
 The reason that this matters is that 
they have been heavily used by non EU residents such as those in the United States and Latin 
America for cross border debt listings.
21
 
ESMA has issued a series of non-exhaustive guidelines in relation to the Regulation dealing 
with the definition of inside information on commodity derivatives in relation to commodity 




of issuers and the situations where inside information cannot have its disclosure delayed 
because of the risk of misleading the public. Finally, there are guidelines on market 
soundings,
22
 setting out the factors and steps that must be taken into account as well as the 
relevant record keeping rules that apply where information is disclosed as part of an 
information sounding regime. It is unfortunate that these do not go into greater depth and 
clarity. 
Types of the offence 
Insider dealing 
This occurs where a person who is in possession of inside information uses that information 
to buy or sell financial instruments to which the information relates. This will encompass 
using the information to change or cancel an order. Under the FCA’s Market Abuse 
Regulations it includes information that an offeror or potential offeror is going to make for a 
target and information that either party may obtain through due diligence.  
Unfortunately, rather than engage in a clear set of legal definitions regarding the meaning of 
the categories of market abuse, the Regulation provides a rather slight one. The FCA has tried 
to compensate for this by providing a range of practical examples of varying degrees of 
quality and usefulness. It might have been more helpful to indicate the extent to which the 
pre-existing enforcement actions and cases would still be regarded as offences under the new 
regime.  
Examples that the FCA indicates as determining whether or not insider dealing is taking place 
include the following
23
: a director of a company tells a friend socially that he has received a 
takeover offer at a premium to the current share price and the person he has told then enters 




major contract and before this is made public he sells his shares in the company. It covers a 
dealer on a firm’s trading desk accepting a very large order from a client buying an oil futures 
deliverable at a stated time. Before doing this the trader takes a long position (buys) on both 
the firm’s and his own behalf expecting to profit from the client’s trade. Both would be 
insider dealing. It would also be insider dealing where someone trades on inside information 
on equities in a company or in a commodity futures based on information disclosed to them 
under the rules of the market. 
Other examples given by the FCA of insider dealing are: front running,
24
 an offeror in a 
takeover entering into a transaction on the basis of inside information that provides a purely 
economic exposure to movements in the price of the target company’s shares, eg, spread 
betting on them. Finally, it covers an offeror trading for personal benefit in a financial 
instrument affected by the inside information. Thus there is no real movement from the pre-
existing UK law on insider dealing and in any event in the past the enforcement actions and 




 “Inside information” is defined in the Regulation at Art 7.2 and the definition 
25
 is very 
similar to the old law. The information must be of a precise nature, not have been made 
public, relate to one or more issuers or instruments and if it were made public it should have a 
significant effect on prices or related derivatives. It does not seem to be relevant that it is not 
possible to tell which way the market will move. In this respect the law seems to have over 
ruled Jean-Bernard Lafonta v Autorité des marches financiers (2015)
26
 where it was held 




market should be predictable for the offence to take place. This is no longer the case. The 
most obvious change is that the law now catches inside information for spot commodity 
contracts and the use of inside information to vary or terminate an existing order. It also stops 
those possessing inside information from utilising it when dealing in financial instruments, or 
attempting to do so, or recommending or inducing someone else to enter into contracts of the 
basis of it. 
If a reasonable person would or should have realised that it was inside information then the 
regulations treat it as though it was. What exactly this will amount to was dealt with in the 
Hannam case (2014)
27
 and on this point the analysis in the case still seems pertinent to the 
current law regarding whether the inside information is likely to affect market prices. As far 
as “likely” is concerned “We
28
 agree…..that this passage says no more than the 
unremarkable proposition that ‘likely’ means something between 5% probable and 95% 
probable.” The Tribunal continued “the litmus test is whether a reasonable investor would be 
likely to take the information (we add: information which, of course, must be capable of 
having an effect on price) into account in deciding what to do….The information must be 
sufficiently material that it may have an effect on his decisions. That is the sort of information 
which must be made public in a transparent market and which must not be disclosed to a 
limited group of people without good reason.”
29
 They added that “an insider cannot do what 
the issuer itself could not do: ie, cannot….validly claim to be able to disclose inside 
information without a duty of confidentiality being imposed on the recipient.”
30
 
Some decisions that could impact on the price of investments involve protracted steps and 
these can be ‘precise’ within the meaning of the Regulation provided that the information 
concerned is specific enough to cause those who have heard it to draw conclusions regarding 
the potential price of an investment. The matter was discussed by the European Court of 
Justice in Markus Geltl v Daimler AG (2012)
31




regard to this case
32
 that the value of investments is not necessarily affected by one factor but 
by a series of events which may take place over a period of time. In any particular case the 
court or tribunal will need to decide at which stage the facts should have been publicly 
known. Unfortunately, the Court did not give specific guidance on the key issue of when 
public announcements should have been made although in many cases this will be 
determined by the rules of the exchange on which the investment in traded. In the case of 
OTC contracts the matter is less clear and will depend on the exact facts. 
Art 7.4 of the Regulation introduces the “reasonable investor” test which was already part of 
the previous UK law.
33
 Recital 14 assumes that such a person makes decisions on the basis of 
the information that is available to them. Elements that are taken into account in determining 
this include the likely impact, the information he will have on the issuer’s activities, how 
reliable that information is and any relevant market variables. 
Turning to the question of what inside information is; under the new Regulation one example 
given by the FCA
34
 is that before the publication of LME stock levels a metal trader 
discovers from an insider that aluminium stocks have significantly reduced. The trader then 
buys a significant number of aluminium futures. Another FCA example relates to commodity 
derivatives
35
 is that of information of a precise nature which has not yet been made public, 
relating to such derivatives or related spot prices where it is reasonably expected that it would 
be released or is required to be. This may be because of the rules of a market, contractual 
practice or custom. Another example is given in relation to emission allowances or auctioned 
products it is information of a precise nature which has not been made public, relating to such 
instruments and which if it were made public would be likely to have a significant effect on 
their prices or those of related derivatives. There are exceptions
36
 for political bodies acting 





If someone possesses inside information and unlawfully discloses it to anyone else then it is 
an offence unless the release is part of the normal exercise of a professional duty. The general 
disclosure obligation requires issuers to notify the public as soon as possible concerning 
inside information that affects them
37
 in a way that enables it to be quickly accessed by the 
public for accurate, complete and timely assessment. In cases where the instrument is limited 
to trading on a regulated market the issuer must make sure that the information is made 
available in the prescribed way to the official storage system and post it on their website and 
update it for a minimum of five years displaying the disclosable inside information. 
Disclosure must be made if it becomes subject to market rumour. This prompt disclosure 
principle brings the law into line with many overseas countries. Both the NYSE and 
NASDAQ have such requirements as do many Latin American countries.
38
 
There may be circumstances where the issuer cannot make the information publicly available 
straight away. Reasons for this that are acceptable are
39
: where it is likely to prejudice the 
issuer’s legitimate interests, where the delay is not intended to mislead the public and it is 
kept confidential. There are processes in ESMA’s implementing technical statements
40
 that 
must be followed, including retaining the dates and times when the inside information first 




ESMA’s draft guidelines give further examples illustrating when it is acceptable not to 
release information because it might be against a party’s interests to publish immediately. 
These are: where there are ongoing negotiations regarding a deal, where approaches are 
required from third parties outside the firm and new inventions where patents are awaited. If 




make sure it can satisfy the announcement to market requirement including any required 
release of records to the FCA
42
, they must maintain insider lists and engage in record 
keeping. 
There are three situations however where information requires immediate release: where 
inside information is materially different to an earlier public pronouncement on the same 
matter, or it contrasts with market expectations based on previous information provided by 
the issuer. In addition, there is a requirement to publish information where the issuer has 
previously announced that financial obligations are unlikely to be met. Issuers are also 
required to inform the FCA where disclosure is delayed if the FCA (or equivalent body 
elsewhere in the EU)  requires it. The issuer must also explain how the requirements have 
been met. 
Thus a failure to disclose inside information which is reportable as soon as possible amounts 
to market abuse. In Tejoori Ltd (2017)
43
 the company concerned
44
 held two significant 
investments, one of which was a shareholding in a second company, Bekon UK Ld which it 
valued in its financial statements at US $ 3.35m. On 12
th
 July 2016 it was notified by that 
company that it was being taken over on terms which meant that Tejoori would get no initial 
consideration and with only the possibility of deferred consideration, and that at a 
considerably lower level than Tejoori’s published estimation. Tejootri was required to 
disclose this information as soon as possible but none was made until 10
th
 August 2016 when 
Bekon and the company buying it did so, but in the process made no reference to Tejoori. 
Following speculation on the internet Tejoori’s share price rose sharply and the London 
Stock Exchange then contacted Tejoori’s nominated adviser asking for details. Tejoori finally 
made an announcement on 24
th
 August 2016. This was determined by the FCA to be a breach 






“Tejoori’s failure to promptly disclose inside information misled the market in Tejoori’s 
shares and prevented investors from making fully informed investment decisions.” They were 
fined £70,000 after a 30% deduction for co-operating. 
Part of the importance on this case is that there is no defence in making an honest mistake as 
to the position of releasing inside information. The case also clarified the meaning of ‘inside 
information’
46
 as “Information that is likely to have a significant effect on the prices of 
financial instruments or derivative financial instruments, if it were to be made public, (it) 
means information a reasonable investor would be likely to use as part of the basis of their 
investment decisions.” 
Regrettably the FCA did not use this first action under the new Regulation to spell out more 
widely how they plan to interpret the wording of the new law. There has since been one more 
enforcement action, namely that of Interactive Brokers (UK) Ltd (2018)
47
 who were fined 
for poor market abuse controls. They had failed to adequately train staff and had farmed out 
their compliance function to a third party on an unsatisfactory basis. They were fined 
£1,049,412. Again no wider guidance on the new law was given. 
Relevant Takeover Code Provisions 
 
If behavior is in line with the Takeover Code then it will normally be legal. The Code has a 
number of provisions relating to information. There are specific requirements relating to the 
disclosure of information that is not generally available to the public. Offerors (or their 
advisers) must notify a firm or its advisers when there is an intention to make an offer
48
 and 
“….all persons privy to confidential information; and particularly price sensitive 
information….must treat that information as secret and not only pass it to another person if it 
is safe to do so and that person is made aware of the need for secrecy.”
49




cover what must be done when a statement is to be set aside
50
, the timing of public 
announcements
51
, the announcement of the number of securities in an issue
52
, information 
published before the ending of an offer period
53
, the need for equality of information for 
shareholders
54









There are also requirements in the Code regarding the standards of care to be applied in 
takeovers. These cover issues such as the requirement that someone making a statement that 
they are not going to make a takeover offer should do so in language that is as clear and 
unambiguous as possible,
58
 and in determining the acceptability of statements the Takeover 
Panel will consider not only the statement itself but also the manner and any subsequent 
reporting of it.
59
 The requirements as to standards include “Each document, announcement or 
other information published, or statement made, during the course of an offer must be 
prepared with the highest standards of care and accuracy. The language used must clearly 
and concisely reflect the position being described and the information given must be 
adequately and fairly presented.”
60
 Post offer undertakings must state that it is such, specify 
the time period and prominently state any qualifications or conditions.
61
There are detailed 
general obligations as to information
62
, a requirement that shareholders must be given 
sufficient information and advice to enable them to reach a properly informed decision as to 
the merits and demerits of an offer
63
, together with requirements regarding profit forecasts 




In addition there are requirements regarding the timing of announcements with regard to 
documentation and dealing. An announcement is required when there is a firm intention to 




make an offer, when there has been an approach to take over and there is rumour or 
“untoward share price movement” or where this occurs prior to making an offer. In addition 
where negotiations concerning an offer are about to extend beyond a very narrow group of 
people or a purchaser is sought for 30% or more of the voting rights of a company and there 
is rumour or “untoward share price movement”.
65
 A subsequent announcement by an offeree 
company relating to a new offer also faces requirements on the timing and nature of the 
release of information
66
, as do acquisitions from a single shareholder making an offer
67
, 
immediately following a revised offer
68
, the requirement for an immediate announcement if 
an offer has been amended
69
, the revision of a cash offer
70
, the timing and contents of an 
offer
71
, inducement fees and related arrangements
72
, the distribution of documents in an 
offer
73
 and regarding the final day rule, fulfilment of acceptance conditions, timing and 
announcements.
74
 They also exist regarding offeree announcements after day 39 of a 
takeover
75




The content of announcements faces some rules in the Code as well regarding the timing of 
announcements and any subsequent announcement of a new offer
77
 together with a 




 in relation 
to restrictions on dealings by offerors and concert parties, is unlikely to amount to market 
abuse if it is expressly required or permitted by the rule and it conforms to any General 
Principle in Section B of the Takeover Code that is relevant. 
 
Market Manipulation 
It is a criminal offence if someone enters into a transaction which: gives misleading signals as 
to the supply or demand or price of a financial instrument, emission allowance or a spot 




these financial or related instruments. Examples given by the FCA
80
 include collaborating to 
ensure a dominant market position over the supply or demand for an investment or creating 
unfair trading practices. It is also a criminal offence if they disseminate information which is 
likely to give a false or misleading impression as to the supply, demand or price of such a 
contract where the person disseminating the information knew or ought to have known that it 
was misleading; or transmits false or misleading information or provides false inputs in 
relation to a benchmark where the person making the statement or input knew or ought to 




The main problem here is that it potentially differs from the pre-existing law but no 
explanation has been given to provide clarification. What then is the difference?  The old law 
also contained the categories of market abuse of: failing to observe proper standards of 
market behaviour,
82
 giving a false or misleading impression of the supply, demand or price of 
an investment,
83




 and encouraging others.
86
 To 
what extent are these types of behaviour caught by the new definition of market abuse? 
Giving ‘misleading signals as to the supply or demand or price of a financial instrument’ 
would certainly seem to cover the ground of ‘giving a false impression’ above. Market 
distortion would also seem to be within the parameters of the new definition. Questions 
remain however concerning the other two categories from the previous law. Let us then turn 
to them
87
. The “failure to observe proper standards of behaviour” used to be defined as: 
where the behaviour concerned was “…based on information which is not generally 
available to those using the market but which , if available to a regular user of the market, 
would be, or would be likely to be, regarded by him as relevant when deciding the terms on 
which transactions in qualifying investments should be effected, and…is likely to be regarded 




the standard of behaviour reasonably expected of a person in his position in relation to the 
market.”
88
  The other category which remains uncertain is that of utilising “fictitious devices” 
which consisted of carrying out transactions which employ fictitious devices or deception.
89
 
Clearly if the utilisation of either approach was to give misleading signals as to the price of a 
financial instrument it would fall within the remit of the existing law. However, it is fair to 
add that none of the enforcement cases brought so far by the FSA/ FCA or the cases that went 
to full hearing were specifically on these two areas. It may therefore be that in the process of 
drafting the new law there was a belief that any behaviour within such areas was either likely 
not to occur or that any such behaviour could be caught within the new definitions. Whether 
or not that is the case there may be infrequent instances where slimming down the definition 
may lead to cases slipping through the net. Maintaining the previous definitions, or 
something reasonably close to them may have been safer. 
If the new law is intended to include the remainder of these areas then why does it not say so? 
If ESMA and the FCA regard such activities as still being caught under the Regulation, why 
do they not say so? In the absence of either there remains the distinct possibility that the law 
on market abuse is slightly narrower than the preceding law. That said it would be highly 
risky for anyone in the market place to carry on business on that assumption. 
 
Issues arising 
In this context it is necessary to consider what “financial instrument” and “benchmark” both 
mean. In addition, it is necessary to determine what is the permitted behaviour in these areas 
when a person may lawfully engage in these activities. “Financial instruments” is defined as 
meaning:
90





investment schemes; (iv) derivatives such as futures, options, forward rate agreements and 
any other derivative, eg, a contract for differences relating to securities, interest rates, yields, 
emission allowances, indices or other financial measures; (v) other derivatives relating to 
commodities that can be settled in cash; (vi) derivatives relating to commodities that can be 
settled on a regulated market, an MTF or an OTF other than wholesale energy markets that 
must be settled physically; (vii) derivatives relating to commodities that can be physically 
settled; (viii) derivatives relating to credit risk; (ix) financial contacts for differences; (x) 
derivatives relating to climate variables, freight prices or economic predictions (eg, inflation 
rates) which can be settled in cash; and (xi) emission allowances. “Benchmark” means
91
 any 
rate, index or figure which is released to the public to determine a price or estimated price. 
 
Insider lists  
Insider lists showing those with potential access to inside information must be and 
constantly kept up to date by firms that are in possession of inside information in a 
prescribed form detailing those in possession of the relevant information and the list must be 
retained for a minimum of five years.
92
 There must be two lists: one relating to each specific 
deal or activity, and the second listing the permanent insiders. The responsibility for the list 
lies with the issuer. Anyone on the list must be aware of their legal or regulatory duties with 
regard to disclosing or misusing inside information and they must confirm this to the issuer. 
The minimum requirement is for the names of those who have access to the information to 
be listed, why they are listed, the date and time they accessed inside information and the date 
of the list’s compilation. The list should include as a minimum: surnames including birth 
surnames where they have changed since, forenames, date of birth, national insurance 




where there was too much national divergence.
93
 Solicitors, investment bankers, accountants 
and any other professional advisers receiving such information must also be on the list.
94
 
The key issue that arises here is, who else needs adding? Unfortunately, there is a lack of 
clarity as, at the date of writing
95
 the FCA have not produced a definition. One area of 
uncertainty is whether it covers those acting as agent of an agent, eg, solicitors acting for 
underwriters or a custody bank acting for a Global Depositary Receipt facility. The general 
view appears to be that it only catches those acting on behalf of the issuer; but this appears 
to be debateable. Certainly employees of accountants, investment banks and solicitors whose 
firms are acting on a transaction would need to be included. What is unsatisfactory is the 
FCA leaving the matter in a state of uncertainty. As would be expected the list must be 
provided to the FCA at their request.
96
 
The definition of “order” again has been left without a statutory definition, and the FCA’s 
approach likewise has been to leave it out of their glossary. Their general approach in the 
handbook seems to make most sense primarily in terms of the equity markets although they 
have not explained how they will apply it to bespoke trading such as the OTC markets. They 
seem to regard any information entering or leaving the firm as relevant, but if that is the case 
then the regime is impossible to police. The FCA do require “appropriate, proportionate 
(and) effective”
97
 controls but have not yet provided suitable parameters to facilitate firms 
knowing how definition this will be applied. They have however said that they will be 
influenced by the European regulators. 
Directors and senior officers’ dealings in securities traded in the EU must be reported by that 
individual to their national regulator and the issuer, and in the case of the latter they must 




What is market manipulation in practice? 
There appears to be no intention of significantly changing the previous English law 
regarding what market abuse is but unfortunately it is again not clear to precisely what 
extent this is true. The main aim appears to be to extend its definition and develop some of 
the associated regulatory requirements.  
The main impact of the new definition is that there are dealing restrictions when the party 
concerned is in possession of inside information and prompt disclosure requirements 
coupled with, as discussed above, insider lists (already found in the UK) and limitations on 
directors and senior officers’ dealings regardless of whether the party concerned was in 
possession of inside information. The disclosure requirements involve not only promptness 
but due procedure must be followed.
98
 
The current FCA Market Abuse Handbook 
As the FCA make clear
99
 this handbook “does not exhaustively describe all the factors to be 
taken into account in determining whether behaviour amounts to market abuse” and cross 
refers to the relatively brief summary in the Market Abuse Regulation. Unhelpfully, their 
position is that the absence of a factor being mentioned does not in itself amount to a 
contrary intention. There are two key factors either of which would be sufficient: that the 
person concerned has failed to discharge a legal or regulatory obligation, such as making a 
disclosure and that the person had created a reasonable expectation which gave rise to a duty 
to inform those to whom he gave that impression of that the state of affairs no longer exists 





 “provides that in determining whether someone knows or ought to know that 




know or should have known that the person from whom they received it was an insider…and 
(they were) in the position of the person who has inside information would know or should 
have known that it is inside information.” 
It adds that ‘front running’
102
 will be regarded as taking place where a party enters into a 
transaction for an investment which will provide the investor with a purely financial 
exposure to a target company’s share price and acting for an offeror using inside information 
on an own account basis in the context of a takeover.
103
 
The factors that determine whether or not information has been made public are
104
: whether 
the information has been disclosed to a prescribed market, a prescribed platform through a 
regulatory information service; whether the information is contained in records that are open 
to inspection by the public; whether the information is otherwise generally available through 
publication, available on the internet or can be derived from those. It makes no difference if 
a fee has to be paid to access it and whether the information can be obtained by observation 
by the public without breach of privacy or confidentiality laws. In these contexts it makes no 
difference that the information is only available outside the UK, or that it can only be 
accessed by someone with above average financial resources or skill.
105
 One example 
given
106
 (and it seems a fairly obvious one) is of a situation that will not amount to market 
abuse is “if a passenger on  a train passing a burning factory calls his broker and tells him 
to sell shares in the factory’s owner.” This is regarded as legitimately accessing information 
by public means. Thus the situation here remains as it was under the previous UK law.
107
 
In determining whether there is a pending order for a client it is relevant that the person has 
been approached by another and the transaction is not immediately executed on an arm’s 
length basis in response to a price they have just quoted him or the person has taken on a 







Recommending or inducing  
 
The following examples of behavior which the FCA regard as falling within the category of 
“recommending or inducing” include a director in possession of inside information who 
instructs an employee to sell a financial instrument covered by that information; and 
someone who recommends a friend to engage in behavior which would be market abuse if 




Engaging in legitimate business activities does not amount to market abuse.
110
 Factors which 
determine whether or not it is a legitimate activity are: the extent to which the trading is 
carried out to hedge a risk and the extent to which the activity achieves that; the reason that 
the information is inside information is that in the case of a transaction carried out on the 
basis of inside information there is no legal or regulatory reason for it to be published; 
whether the trading is connected with a client transaction and has no impact on the price of 
the investment concerned or the client was informed of the trade and did not object; and the 
extent to which the person’s behaviour was reasonable by the proper standards of the market 
concerned.
111
   
 
This raises the issue of what behavior in executing an order on behalf of another is carried 
out legitimately. Key issues are any of the following: whether they have complied with the 
relevant part of the FCA Conduct of Business Sourcebook
112
; whether the person has agreed 
with its client that it will act in a particular way when carrying out the order; whether their 
behavior was with a view to carrying out the order effectively and the extent to which the 




addition, whether if the trading or bidding is connected with a transaction entered into with a 





The following are not regarded by the FCA as indicating insider dealing in the context of 
takeovers and mergers
114
: the use of inside information solely for proceeding with a takeover 
or merger when seeking irrevocable undertakings or expressions of support to accept an 
offer to buy securities; making arrangements in connection with an issue of securities that 
are to be issued as consideration in a takeover or merger, including underwriting or placing 
the securities where these activities are proportionate to the risks assumed; and making 
arrangements to offer cash as consideration for a takeover as an alternative to offering 
securities. 
 
A range of fairly obvious examples can be read in the FCA’s Code of Market Abuse.
115
 
They include a director telling a friend in a social environment that his company had 
received a takeover bid at a higher share price than the current trading value, and the 
recipient of that information entering into a spread bet to profit from any increase in the 
target company’s share price.
116
 This is a rather strange example. Not only is the situation 
too obvious an example to need spelling out, but it would also be an offence if the recipient 
had entered into any other relevant investment to profit from a share price increase. 
 
A second example the FCA provides is that of an employee choosing to sell his shares in the 
company which employs him, having discovered by an internal communication, (and 
presumably before there has been a public announcement, though unfortunately the example 
does not say this) that his company has lost a major contract.
117




provided is of an employee on a trading desk at a firm dealing in oil derivatives who enters 
into trades both on his own account and the  firm’s account following the receipt of a large 
client account order to enter into a large long position (to buy) in oil derivatives, to profit 
from the resulting price move. Again the example is slightly odd in that a single long 




The most obvious example follows, namely a person trading in equities on the basis of 
inside information
119
. It is followed by the example of someone dealing in commodity 
futures on a trading venue on the basis of inside information and reasonably expecting it to 
be disclosed in accordance with national or EU market rules, contract, practice or customary 
rules.
120
 The Malins decision (2005)
121
 suggests that such a person should check that the 
information has been properly released before trading. 
 
An “unlawful disclosure” is indicated by
122
 the disclosure of inside information in a social 
context and managers selectively disclosing briefings to analysts. It would not however 
amount to this if the disclosure is to a government department, the Bank of England, the 
Takeover Commission or any other regulator to satisfy a legal or regulatory requirement in 
the normal exercise of their duties.
123
 Nor is it wrong to disclose inside information where 
this is required under the Stock Exchange Rules. It is also acceptable where disclosure is 
made by a broker to a potential buyer in the course of their duties in a sale where the 
disclosure is made to sell the investment, to maintain liquidity without which the transaction 




An “unlawful disclosure” is that which takes place outside the proper scope of someone’s 




is permitted by the FCA, the Takeover Code, a trading venue or an auction platform and 
whether when this was done the information was subject to the imposition of a disclosure 
requirement on the person to whom the information was released. Likewise, whether it was 
reasonable to release the information in the proper performance of someone’s duties, 
whether it was for the purpose of seeking or receiving advice regarding a takeover bid or 
was reasonable for the purpose of facilitating an investment, commercial or underwriting 





Factors determining whether or not behavior is legitimate in relation to Art 12 (1) (a) of the 
Regulation include whether the person has an actuating purpose behind the transaction, or an 
illegitimate one, or if it was executed in a way which created a false or misleading 
impression.
126
 Factors that will determine whether there are legitimate reasons are whether 
the transaction is carried out pursuant to a prior legal or regulatory requirement, whether it is 
executed in a way that is necessary for a market platform to operate fairly and efficiently and 
the extent to which it opens a new position creating a market risk rather than closing it out. 
Also, whether the transaction complied with the rules of a relevant trading venue concerning 




On the other hand it is very unlikely to amount to manipulation simply because the user of a  
trading venue is dealing at times and in sizes of investments that are most profitable to 
them
128
. Likewise, the mere fact that prices are trading outside their normal range does not 








whether an abnormal price has been created and the extent to which the person’s behavior 
was responsible for that, the extent to which they had an interest in that price and the extent 
to which the price or volatility was outside its normal range. Relevant behavior here would 






 are concerned key elements will be the extent to which the 
person is willing to relax his control to help maintain an orderly market and the price at 
which he is willing to do so. It is unlikely to be an abusive squeeze if they are willing to lend 
the investment. The more likely the behavior is to cause a multilateral settlement default, the 
more likely it is that there has been an abusive squeeze. Other factors will be the extent to 
which prices under the delivery mechanisms diverge from the price for them outside those 
mechanisms. The wider the divergence, the more likely it is that an abusive squeeze has 
taken place. Also, if, following the impact of the contract the spot price is substantially 
different from the forward market price it is more likely that there has been an abusive 
squeeze.
132
 Not all squeezes are abusive though, it can occur when the market is tight and 
smaller transactions can move prices more. In addition, having a significant influence over 
the supply of, or demand for, or delivery mechanisms for an investment, for example, 
through ownership, borrowing or reserving the investment in question, is not of itself likely 
to be abusive.
133
 Where a trader holds a short position that will make a profit if a price will 
fall out of an index, and this will occur if the price falls below a certain level at the close of 
the market and if at that time he places a large sell order just before the close of trading to 
achieve this it will amount to market abuse.
134
 Another example would be a fund manager 
placing a large order to buy illiquid shares just before the close to achieve an artificially high 
price and thus inflate the value of his fund.
135
 Another would be where a trader with a long 




either refuses to re-lend these bonds or will only lend them to parties he believes will not re-
lend to the market. His purpose will presumably be to position the price at which those with 
short positions have to deliver to satisfy their obligations at a materially higher level, making 




Dissemination of inside information will be held to have occurred where a normal and 
reasonable person ought to have known that the information was misleading.
137
 Examples of 
dissemination would include someone posting information on an internet bulletin board or 
chat room knowing them to be false or misleading statements about a corporate takeover.
138
 
There will be a defence to a charge of breaching a Chinese wall is if the only way they could 
have acquired the relevant knowledge would have been to acquire it from the other side of 





Conduct of Business rule at COBS 12 applies to all types of investment research. The FCA 
recognises the reality that if research is being carried out for a firm’s internal use there is 
little danger of conflicts of interest arising.
140
 However, it is clear that the FCA think it 
inappropriate for internal research papers to be used for the firm’s own advantage and then 
to be given to clients where it is reasonable to suppose it might influence their decisions. 
There is clearly a potential conflict of interest between those carrying out the research on 
one hand and corporate finance and sales personnel on the other.
141
 Where conflicts of 
interest arise there is senior management responsibility for resolving the matter.
142
 For this 
reason there are normally internal compliance rules on the point. A firm’s conflict of interest 
policy must provide for its investment research to be only distributed through its normal 




the research in any other way. 
 
The firm must see that its research is impartial and it should at least consider adding to its 
conflict of interest policy regarding the timing of the release of the research, eg, around the 
time of a public offering.
143
 Research intended initially for internal use should not be used 
internally and then forwarded to clients where it might materially influence their 
decisions.
144
 If a firm produces non independent research it must be clearly identified as 
such, contain a clear statement if orally provided, saying in either case that it has not been 
prepared in accordance with the necessary legal requirements for independent research, but 
it is not subject to any prohibition.
145




One consequence of the Regulation is that written or electronic correspondence involving 
recommendations for investment is treated as an intention to solicit. The person and 
institution responsible face a reverse burden of proof in showing that the analysis 
communicated is objective and that any conflict of interest has been disclosed. It should be 
noted that MiFID II sets out further requirements relating to circulating research but the 
details go beyond the parameters of this article. 
 
Managers’ disclosure requirements 
Managers have an obligation to disclose to both the issuer and the FCA their own account 
dealings in investments where the transaction reaches € 5,000.
147
 “Investments” in this 
context includes shares, debt instruments and related derivatives,
148
 although it does not 
extend to equity dealings outside Europe. In this context “managers” covers directors and 




information. It is extended to the managers’ “closely associated persons”. Issuers must make 
public the reports from their managers within three business days. 
There are closed periods where the managers
149
 and closely associated persons cannot deal. 
This is determined to be thirty calendar days
150
 before interim financial report 
announcements or publicly reportable end of year reports. This ties in with the FCA’s own 
past research which showed that such situations appeared to be preceded by insider dealing 
in 28.9% of takeover announcements and 21.7% of trading announcements.
151
 Some 
exceptions allow trading, eg, severe financial difficulty and employee share or savings 
schemes. Some issuers do not permit directors and senior officers to trade in securities. If 
this is the case the systems and controls to regulate it internally will not be needed. 
Sovereign issuers are exempt from the laws and in this context market designated bodies 
will be central banks and a limited range of other public bodies
152
 in so far as they are 
engaging in debt management or exchange rate policy. 
There is a requirement for greater transparency. The preamble to the Regulation states: 
“Greater transparency of transactions conducted by persons discharging managerial 
responsibilities at the issuer level and, where applicable, persons closely associated with 
them, constitutes a preventative measure against market abuse, particularly insider dealing. 
The publication of those transactions on at least an individual basis can also be a highly 
valuable source of information to investors.”
153
  
The obligation to publish individual transactions is extended and also incorporates pledging 
and lending financial instruments as these can have a significant impact on the share price in 





Chinese walls are a critical factor in maintaining confidentiality of inside information. 
Hedge funds face something of a problem here as the relevant divisions found in investment 
banks and stockbrokers do not exist within their organisations. Thus, if anyone in the 
organisation receives inside information it affects the entire hedge fund.  
In those institutions with chinese walls, wall crossings are permitted when sounding out the 
market even where the market soundings take place outside the EU. To satisfy this the 
transaction needs to be relatively immaterial to the price of the investments. It is permitted to 
cross the wall where appropriate. “Wall crossing is a process whereby a company can 
legitimately provide inside information to a third party. A company may wall cross a variety 
of third parties ranging from large industrial shareholders to small shareholders or 
completely unrelated parties.”
154
 There are a number of reasons for wall crossing “a 
common reason is to give the third party inside information about a proposed transaction by 
a company that is publicly listed (for example, a merger or acquisition, or fundraising 
transactions including equity issuances)” …to discuss the third party’s views.” A suitable 
example would be the directors of a company seeking the views regarding a takeover they 
are making from major shareholders. As would be expected, the recipient is then excluded 
from trading unless a public announcement has been made. If it is then decided that the 
transaction is not going ahead an announcement to that effect should be made and is referred 
to as a ‘cleansing statement’. 
Market soundings are often needed to determine whether potential investors would be 
prepared to take up a market offer prior to launching it. This is a vital approach to the 
effective operation of the markets; even more so when prices are volatile. Thus the 




disclosure “accompanied by the imposition of confidentiality requirements.” This is relevant 
to internal wall crossing in an organisation and the release of information externally 
accompanied by notification that it renders the recipient an insider, which is in line with the 
comment in Grøngoord and Bang (2005)
155
 that disclosure can only be made of 
confidential information when necessary and in such cases the recipient must be placed 
under a duty of confidentiality unless it is clear that the person concerned already appreciates 
this. “Once confidential information is passed on, control is lost over that information: the 




In the event of suspicions of a client or counterparty there are conflict of interest issues 




 requires those, including public institutions producing or disseminating 
research or investment recommendations to do so in a way which presents the information 
objectively with any conflict of interest, or other interest relating to the investments being 
disclosed. To maintain a harmonious approach across Europe, ESMA is required to draft 
regulatory technical standards for those involved in disseminating research and 
recommendations.  
Now that MiFID II is in place the regime will be broader in accordance with the effect of its 
provisions in that both independent and non-independent advice is treated as customised for 
each recipient. In addition to the Regulation’s requirement that the advice be transparent, 
objective and that due disclosure should take place, MiFID II imposes a higher burden of 




that advice for the investor concerned. 
In one firm alone between the law coming into effect on 3
rd
 July 2016 and early November 
2016 they sent 30,000 recommendations to 13,000 clients and potential clients and 500,000 
disclosure emails. 70 conflicts of interest were reported. In practical terms this type of 




There are safe harbours and these extend further than under the preceding regime. There is 
an exemption from the market abuse regime for share buy backs
159
 which are permitted if 
they are carried out to reduce the issuer’s share capital, to exercise convertibles or as part of 
employee share option schemes of the issuer or an associated company. If this is done the 
issuer must disclose the details to the FCA and the public before trading. Share and bond 
stabilisation programmes are exempt if carried out for a limited period and within certain 
price limits. Again, a report must be made to the FCA and also in this case to the trading 
venue. Pre-transactional discussions with potential investors (“wall crossings”) which may 
need to involve inside information, eg, financing a takeover, are permitted. These must 
follow a predetermined procedure and records kept for three years. The information must 
also be issued to the market as soon as possible and apply accepted market practices. 
Jurisdiction 
The Regulation also expands the reach of some of the EU rules to markets that previously 
operated outside the EU’s market abuse regime because the application of the Regulation to 
MTFs have drawn into the area controlled the London Stock Exchange’s AIM, the Irish 
Stock Exchange’s Global Exchange Market and the Luxembourg Stock Exchange Euro 






The existing EU regulated markets are also affected because the record keeping 
requirements and applicable procedural approaches have been extended. It remains to be 
seen whether a consequence of this is that some of those with paper currently issued on an 
EU exchange decide to move to an exchange outside the EU where such onerous rules will 
not apply.  
In addition, the rules apply to trading outside the EU and as far as insider dealing is 
concerned there does not need to be proof of an intention for the insider to benefit, which is 
a change from the preceding English law. Any relevant contract traded in the EU will of 
course be caught and as will ghost quotes where no trade results.  
Global banks are going to be particularly affected by the jurisdictional effects. Depositary 
receipts are the most extreme example where the bank issuing the receipts could be doing so 
to parties in almost every state on earth. In some cases insider lists will need to be held 
outside the EU. There may then prove to be conflicts between the requirement from a 
regulator or court in the EU that such information be provided and privacy or data 
protection laws in a third state that preclude doing so, or may require information to be 
redacted first.  
New market developments 
One key area is the application of the market abuse laws to new market activities. A key 
area here are dark pools, ie, private exchanges where institutional investors can trade very 
large volumes without public knowledge of their trading intentions prior to execution. They 
raise the key problems of a lack of transparency, potential conflicts of interest and the 
capacity the arrangements offer for market abuse. Whilst these have yet to prove a basis for 




the US both Barclays and Credit Suisse were fined for making false and misleading 
statements and failing to disclose material adverse facts concerning its dark pool operations. 
The New York District Attorney believed that the banks gave high speed traders an unfair 
advantage.
161
 This remains an area where greater clarity in the law would be welcome. 
Conclusions 
The uncertainties discussed above remain a problem for participants in the financial 
markets. It is not helped by the predisposition of the FCA to operate without the presence of 
key definitions in their rules and in practice with the benefit of hindsight. They have 
discretionary powers, especially in interpreting the FCA Principles and there remains an 
absence of clarity.  
Any information entering or leaving a firm is potentially caught by the new Regulation, 
which, as seen, is going to be a problem operationally. There remains uncertainty 
concerning the position after the UK has left the European Union. The FCA has indicated 
that they will be influenced by the European regulators and there will be obvious reasons for 
doing so after the UK has left the EU in terms of maintaining a pan European level playing 
field for large firms in the City, but there may though be no legal requirement to do so. 
However, this does open up the possibility of a migration away from existing enforcement 
action decisions on an unpredictable basis. 
Hannam (2014)
162
 has shown that the interpretation of what is inside information may be 
wider than was supposed and that potentially carries over to the new law. The Regulation 
causes more information to be kept by companies than was previously the case. The current 
legal position will sometimes result in a market participant having more of a judgement call 




prove to be problems in the future as a result of the law having been drafted to make sense 
in terms of the exchange traded equity markets. It may mean there will be a lack of 
predictability in advance of any enforcement actions or cases in the area in applying the law 
to bespoke OTC trades. Thus, the key conclusion is that the Regulation and its interpretation 
by the regulators have left the law in an unacceptably vague state. 
In addition, there may be conflict of interest issues between the reporting party and their 
client in blowing the whistle through making a report to the FCA or in some circumstances 
the Stock Exchange on a client or counterparty. There is no evidence of this having been 
considered. There are certainly a large number. In the ten months to October 2017 there 




The current plan is for the Regulation is to be reviewed by the European Commission within 
four years of its coming into effect. Any problems that do arise at least have the potential to 
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